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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of corruption on the size of shadow economy. Unlike most
of the previous literature, the paper accounts for the fact that some corrupt practices tend
to be commonplace in some parts of the world, while other countries may be plagued by
other types of corruption. First, a theoretical model is developed to show that bribes to get
projects are likely to have different consequences with respect to shadow economy size
than bribes that are paid to lower taxes. Second, the issue is examined empirically.
Although cross-country data on different types of corruption are unavailable, an interaction
term of the level of corruption and geography can capture differences in the consequences
of corruption between countries. IV regressions and bootstrapping indicate that corruption
does not affect shadow economy size outside tropics. Instead, the higher the tropical area
fraction of a country, the more significant is the enlarging impact of a certain level of
corruption on the size of shadow economy. Moreover, corruption and shadow economy
seem to be substitutes in tropics, meaning that informal economic activities tend to
increase, if corruption decreases. The result supports the conclusions drawn from the
model.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in corruption-related issues. Even if this does not
necessarily mean that corruption has become more common, it certainly implies that awareness
of the risks associated with corrupt practices has risen. Corruption is a particularly acute
problem in developing economies: in the 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index, 50 percent of
developing countries scored less than three out of the no-corruption score of ten, and the level
of corruption was alarmingly high in 90 percent of them (Transparency International 2003).
Moreover, it has been estimated that the losses caused by corruption as a percentage of GDP
have been not only high but also on the increase in various developing economies (Dreher et al.
2004, Tanzi 1998).
Many economists have tried to explain the prevalence of corruption in developing economies.
Treisman (2000) categorizes the explanations into political, historical, social and cultural, and
economic factors. As the classication implies, corruption is closely associated with every aspect
of society. Therefore, it is not surprising that various studies imply that corruption inhibits
productive investment or otherwise lowers GDP growth (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Mauro 1995,
Mauro 1997, Mauro 1998, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Mo 2001, Gyimah-Brempong 2002, and
Méon and Sekkat 2005). Corruption may also decrease government expenditures on operations
and maintenance, and possibly health and education, thereby lowering quality and returns of the
existing public infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997, Mauro 1998, and Gupta et al. 2000).
Moreover, corruption seems to a¤ect the distribution of wealth adversely (Gupta et al. 2002).
Corruption can also a¤ect GDP - or its growth - indirectly by having an impact on the number
of rms or individuals choosing to operate informally in shadow economy. According to Choi and
Thum (2004) and Dreher et al. (2005), corruption and shadow economy are substitutes, meaning
that correlation between the two is negative. This is the case if, for example, bureaucrats have
to lower their bribe demands when rms have the outside option of eeing into shadow economy.
On the other hand, Johnson et al. (1997, 1998, 1999), Friedman et al. (2000) and Hindriks et al.
(1999) claim that the two are complements. Because the evidence gathered so far is, therefore,
rather mixed and in addition often based on questionable econometric techniques, more extensive
discussion is necessary. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature. The most
important contribution of the study is to acknowledge that the consequences of corruption
might di¤er in di¤erent parts of the world and to account for this in the analysis.
Empirical research has tended to handle corruption on a general level, while those theo-
retical studies that have analyzed di¤erent manifestations of corruption have mostly focused
on di¤erences at institutional level. For example, the question of grand vs. petty corruption
concentrates on the position of the bureaucrat being bribed: the former involves bribing higher-
ranking o¢ cials than the latter. Another important issue discussed e.g. by Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) and Bardhan (1997) is the di¤erence between centralized and decentralized corruption.
The former is usually thought to have less severe consequences for e¢ ciency, because the bribee
then tends to (partly) internalize distortions caused by corruption. There are, however, other
di¤erences that could play a role in determining the consequences of corruption and that should,
therefore, be taken into account. For example, bribing bureaucrats to avoid or lower taxes may,
in principle, have quite di¤erent consequences than bribes that are paid to get licenses. It could
be thought that bribes to lower taxes are much more common in developing economies than
in industrialized countries, which have stronger institutions in place to prevent such corrupt
practices. This implies that the income level of a country is important in determining the rela-
tionship between corruption shadow economy (Dreher and Schneider 2006 and Gërxhani 2004).
The problem with the income level is that it is endogenous. There are, however, various studies
that suggest that the geographic location of a country could be an important determinant of
the income level. For example, Gallup et al. (1999) claim that geography and climate play
major roles in economic development by a¤ecting transport costs, disease burden, agricultural
productivity and even economic policy choices. Sachs (2001) emphasizes also that economies
situated in tropical climates face particularly problematic development challenges.
This paper attempts to shed more light on the role played by corruption through two models
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of an economy with formal and informal sectors. In both models, the size of shadow economy
is endogenously determined, as rms may freely choose to function either in formal or informal
economy. The rms operating in the formal sector pay taxes to government. In the rst case,
they have to pay bribes to corrupt government o¢ cials to get projects or licences for the projects.
In the second case, they may attempt to lower the taxes they have to pay through bribes. In
both cases, the relative costs of corruption from the point of view of the rm depend on the size
and political connectedness of the rm. This reects rm-specic features: some rms are better
equipped to deal with corruption and manage, therefore, to pay less. Some rms choose shadow
economy to avoid taxes and to benet from the lower wage and social security payments of the
informal sector. This choice comes with costs, too: the rms operating in shadow economy face
an e¤ective penalty rate reecting payments to local police and bureaucrats in order to stay
informal. The relative sizes of the two sectors can be derived from the level of corruption, the
tax rate and the e¤ective penalty rate, and the size of the formal sector then determines the total
formal-sector output at the optimum. The model indicates that it is necessary to di¤erentiate
between the e¤ects of corruption in di¤erent economic environments: with bribes paid to get
projects, more severe corruption always enlarges shadow economy meaning that the two are
complements but with bribes paid to lower taxes, the e¤ect is ambiguous: in some extreme
cases, corruption can then decrease informal economic activity.
To examine the issue empirically, the study uses the technique of instrumental variables
for a cross-section of countries. The rst results based on the traditional way of doing things
are not that promising and serve mainly to demonstrate that di¤erent proxies for corruption
and instruments used can have a large impact on results: while some regressions indicate that
corruption could have a positive impact on the size of shadow economy, others imply just the
opposite. Instead, strong rule of law, high GDP per capita in the previous period, and strict
regulation of wages and prices seem to be associated with smaller shadow economy more robustly.
When an interaction term of the level of corruption and the tropical area fraction of a country is
added to the analysis to account for the di¤ering consequences of di¤erent types of corruption,
the results indicate again that stricter wage and price regulation decreases informal economic
activity. However, and in support of the idea of the paper, they suggest also that the higher
the share of a countrys area located in tropics, the more a certain level of corruption increases
informal economic activity.1 Moreover, although corruption and shadow economy do not appear
to be connected outside tropics, correlation between the two seems to be negative in tropics.
This result is in accordance with the conclusions of the theoretical part: if corruption and shadow
economy are more likely to be substitutes in a country with poor-quality institutions, countries
located in tropics t the picture.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of corruption in economic
development. Emphasis is on the links between corruption and economic growth, and corruption
and shadow economy. Section 3 sets up the model of an economy with formal and informal
sectors and analyzes the connection between corruption and the scope of informal economic
activity. Section 4 analyzes the same question empirically. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Literature on Corruption
Corruption, dened as the exercise of public power for private gain, occurs if the expected
benets of corrupt practices outweigh the expected costs. The benets are generally associated
with the economic rents present in a society, while the expected costs depend on the probability
of detection and the severity of punishments. For corruption to exist, it is also necessary that
someone has discretionary power over resource allocation (Jain 2001).
Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in the causes and consequences of corruption.
This section concentrates on the issues that are relevant for the model developed in the next
section. The topics most important in this sense comprise the relationship of corruption with
1The result is robust to various alternative measures of institutional quality and scal burden. It holds also
when bootstrapping is used to calculate the standard errors.
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the scope of informal economic activity, i.e. shadow economy, and, through that, o¢ cial-sector
output.
2.1 Sand or Grease?
Although varying degrees of corruption can be found in developed countries, it is generally a
more serious problem in developing economies: in the 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index, 50
percent of developing countries scored less than three out of the no-corruption score of ten, and
the level of corruption was alarmingly highin 90 percent of them (Transparency International
2003). Moreover, it has been estimated that the losses caused by corruption as a percentage of
GDP have been not only high but also on the increase in various developing economies (Dreher
et al. 2004, Tanzi 1998).
Does the evidence that corruption is more common in developing countries necessarily mean
that these countries are worse o¤? After all, it has been claimed that corruption can actually
be benecial in the second-best world with di¤erent political and economic distortions (see
e.g. Bardhan 1997, Mauro 1995, and Tanzi 1998 for more comprehensive discussion). First,
corruption might raise economic growth by removing rigidities detrimental to investment and
by helping people to avoid bureaucratic delays, that is by greasing the wheels. Second,
corruption could increase e¢ ciency by assigning projects to the most e¢ cient rms that are also
capable of paying the highest bribes and in saving time for those for whom time is most valuable.
Third, the possibility of bribes could spur government o¢ cials to work harder. Corruption could
also result in more e¢ cient provision of government services by introducing competition for
scarce government resources (Aidt 2003). Particularly, it might be benecial to institutionalize
corruption instead of allowing it to be completely random.
The idea of benecial corruption is highly controversial. If corruption is there to grease
the wheels, it is probably simultaneously the reason for the need to keep greasing the very
same wheels: after all, rigidities are generally endogenous (Tanzi 1998). On the very basic level,
corruption is harmful because it results in the allocation of most able human capital resources in
rent-seeking opportunities instead of productive activities (Ibid.). Moreover, it distorts markets
by distorting incentives and makes if more di¢ cult for the government to correct market failures.
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point out that the distortionary e¤ects are magnied by the illegality
of corruption. Aidt (2003) discusses, how the theoretical literature on the benets of corruption
is based on problematic assumptions, and Rose-Ackerman (1978) remarks that it is di¢ cult to
limit corruption to the areas in which it could be benecial. The consequences of corruption are
more di¢ cult to deal with for the very same reason: the e¤ects of corruption tend to reverberate
throughout the economy instead of remaining conned to the corrupt transactions. This is an
idea the model presented in this paper tries to capture: by a¤ecting the production decisions
of the rms, corruption rst a¤ects the relative sizes of formal and informal economies and has
then an impact on o¢ cial sector output.
After the increased interest of recent years, there is also empirical evidence of the negative
e¤ects of corruption. Even if the direction of causality between corruption and other variables
is di¢ cult to verify, numerous studies imply that corruption is harmful. Among the issues
discussed in the literature are the relationship between corruption and output and that between
corruption and the size of the shadow economy. The next two subsections give an overview of
these topics. Other important areas that should not be forgotten are the impact of corruption on
welfare in general and, more specically, on the distribution of wealth (see Gupta et al. 2002).
2.2 Corruption and Output
One of the strongest links between corruption and economy is between corruption and economic
development. The causality is likely to go both ways, but e.g. Treisman (2000) and Paldam
(2002) nd evidence that higher log per capita GDP decreases the level of corruption. A natural
explanation is that it is so expensive to ght corruption that only rich countries have the
necessary resources. Accordingly, most studies control for per capita GDP while trying to
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nd factors that could explain the level of corruption. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) argue from a theoretical point of view that corruption lowers economic growth by causing
distortions. They nd, in addition, that the need for secrecy due to the illegality of corruption
increases the distortionary e¤ects and makes corruption more costly.
Causality between corruption and economic development does, therefore, go both ways.
The issue is di¢ cult to solve empirically with current techniques. The method of instrumental
variables is, at the moment, the most popular one, but the high interrelatedness of corruption
and income makes it di¢ cult to nd valid instruments. Because of this, some researchers have
chosen to focus on the e¤ects corruption has on GDP growth, but particularly early evidence is
mixed.2 More recent studies are, however, more convincing: the results of Mauro (1997), Leite
and Weidmann (1999), Mo (2001), Gyimah-Brempong (2002), and Méon and Sekkat (2005)
strongly indicate that corruption has a negative impact on GDP growth.
An issue often discussed in the context of corruption is particularly closely related to eco-
nomic growth: Shleifer and Vishny (1993) nd that corruption inhibits productive investment.
Also Bardhan (1997) claims that corruption can have a negative e¤ect on incentives to invest.
More generally, corruption lowers investment relative to GDP by increasing risks (e.g. by lower-
ing the security of property rights) and by increasing costs. Moreover, it has an impact on the
allocation of resources by a¤ecting the assessments of the relative merits of di¤erent investments
in both public and private sectors.
Mauro (1995) was the rst to verify empirically in a cross-section of countries that corruption
lowers investment, thereby lowering economic growth, a result which has later gained support
from Knack and Keefer (1995), Ades and Di Tella (1997), Brunetti et al. (1998), Mauro (1997),
and Gyimah-Brempong (2002) among others. The detrimental e¤ects of corruption do not
depend solely on the level of overall corruption, but also on its predictability: countries with
more predictable corruption tend to have higher investment rates (Campos et al. 1999 and Wei
1997 for foreign direct investment).
If domestic investors are sensitive to the level of corruption, it should not come as a surprise
that foreign investors are equally - or even more - sensitive (see Lambsdor¤ 2005 for discussion).
Moreover, Wei and Wu (2001) nd that corruption is not equally harmful in obtaining bank
loans, which results in a higher loan-to-FDI ratio meaning that the risk of a currency crisis
escalates.
There are other indirect channels through which corruption might a¤ect the growth rate
of an economy. As Tanzi (1998) discusses, small rms, especially in developing countries, are
particularly vulnerable to corruption, because they lack the resources and connections to ght
it.3 The competitiveness of the markets they have to operate in makes it more di¢ cult for them
to pass on the costs of corruption to their customers. Because small rms are often the engine
for growth, the negative e¤ects of corruption gain further strength.
Corruption may also a¤ect the allocation of public resources: although higher corruption
seems to increase the volume of public investment as a ratio to GDP, it tends to lower govern-
ment expenditures on operations and maintenance (and possibly health and education), thereby
lowering the quality and the returns of existing public infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).
Also Mauro (1998) and Gupta et al. (2000) nd that corruption reduces government spending
on education and possibly on health, which are areas in which it is di¢ cult for government
o¢ cials to gain from corrupt practices.
2.3 The Role of Shadow Economy
Corruption can also a¤ect GDP - or its growth - indirectly by having an impact on the number of
rms or individuals choosing to operate informally in the shadow economy4 , which can be dened
2See e.g. Mauro (1995), Keefer and Knack (1996), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Brunetti et al. (1998) and Li
et al. (2001).
3 In accordance with this nding, the model presented in the next section accounts for the size of the rm.
4Other terms used are informal and uno¢ cial economy. The focus of this paper will be on such informal
economic activities that involve monetary transactions and are not based on barter. The distinction is made,
because the causes of barter-based informal economy tend to di¤er from those of the rest of shadow economy.
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as those "legal value-added creating activities which are not taxed or registered" (Schneider and
Enste 2000). This relationship between corruption and shadow economy is of particular interest
here.
Uno¢ cial economic activities tend to hinder smooth functioning of o¢ cial economy and can,
therefore, have a negative impact on growth. For example, rms operating in the informal
sector avoid paying taxes, which decreases the governments tax revenues and might thus have
a negative impact on the quantity and quality of public spending. Loayza (1997) models this
channel. However, opinions on the relationship di¤er: although larger underground economy
might erode tax base and although several economists have found evidence on how corruption
seems to lower government revenues (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997 and Friedman et al. 2000), a com-
peting, neoclassical, view is that dynamic shadow economy intensies competition and improves
e¢ ciency among other positive impacts (Schneider and Enste 2000). For example, Choi and
Thum (2005) nd that entrepreneursoption to ee into shadow economy mitigates corruption-
related distortions by allowing such entrepreneurs to enter that would not have entered without
shadow economy and by making the bureaucrats demand smaller bribes, which implies that the
existence of informal sector actually supports o¢ cial-sector growth. There is also some evidence
that increased informal production has positive consequences on the formal sector at least in
the form of increased demand: Schneider and Enste (2000) claim, based on Schneider (1998),
that two-thirds of the income earned in shadow economy is spent in the o¢ cial economy.5 How-
ever, as Schneider and Enste also point out, large shadow economy makes conducting e¤ective
economic policy more di¢ cult, because o¢ cial economic indicators, on which such policy should
be based, are then inaccurate.
The varying opinions reect the fact that the consequences - and causes - of shadow economy
di¤er in di¤erent types of countries (Schneider and Enste 2000). According to the literature
review of Gërxhani (2004), the relationship between formal and informal economy seems to be
positive in developed countries, while a negative connection appears to be more likely in less
developed countries. Even if it is di¢ cult to verify a universally applicable relationship between
shadow economy and GDP, the issue is particularly relevant in developing economies, where the
size of shadow economy as percentage of GDP is typically larger than in industrialized countries.
As the scope of informal activity seems to have been on the increase during the last 40 years or
so (Schneider and Enste 2000.), it is more important than ever to take its e¤ects into account.
So the size of shadow economy a¤ects formal economy, even if the direction of the impact
is di¢ cult to deduce and might di¤er between countries. Because corruption has been found
to a¤ect the scope of informal economic activity6 , this is another channel through which it can
a¤ect growth. After the di¤erences of opinion discussed above, existence of two competing views
on the matter should not come as a surprise.
First, Rose-Ackerman (1997, p. 21) claims that corruption and shadow economy are substi-
tutes, indicating negative correlation between the two. The model of Choi and Thum (2005) is
an example of such a situation: in the model, corrupt government o¢ cials have to lower their
bribe demands, if rms have an option of eeing into shadow economy instead of entering the
o¢ cial market. Endogenous bribe demands are crucial in this framework. Building on Choi and
Thum, also Dreher et al. (2005) compare economies with and without informal sector and nd
that corruption is lower in the former case, again due to a decrease in bribe demands in the
presence of shadow economy. Dreher et al. also approach the question empirically by structural
equation modeling, with shadow economy and corruption as latent variables, and conclude that
the estimations are consistent with the theoretical framework, implying that corruption and
shadow economy are indeed substitutes.
Yet, others nd that corruption and shadow economy are complements: empirical evidence
of e.g. Johnson et al. (1997, 1998, 1999) and Friedman et al. (2000) implies that bribery and
corruption increase the share of uno¢ cial economy of GDP.7 Friedman et al. (2000) also build
a model that suggests that over-regulation and corruption discourage o¢ cial-sector production
5The gure applies to Austria and Germany. It might be lower in developing economies.
6See Schneider and Enste (2000) for a literature review.
7The problems associated with these empirical studies are discussed in section 4.
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and are, therefore, associated with relatively larger shadow economy. Hindriks et al. (1999) take
a di¤erent starting point and examine the implications of corruption, extortion and tax evasion
in a three-stage game between taxpayer and tax inspector. If the tax payer colludes with the
inspector, the inspector can underreport the taxable revenue of the tax payer in exchange for a
bribe. Corruption and shadow economy are then positively correlated.
Di¤erent types of corruption might, however, have di¤erent consequences, which should
also be accounted for. And, as Dreher and Schneider (2006) and Gërxhani (2004) point out,
the relationship between corruption and shadow economy might well di¤er in high-income and
low-income countries. This would be particularly natural, if the two groups of countries are
characterized by di¤erent types of corrupt practices. Also, if geography is associated with the
income level of a country, as Sachs (2001) and Gallup et al. (1999) claim, it could have an impact
on the relationship between corruption and shadow economy through its e¤ect on transportation
costs, agricultural productivity, disease burden and economic policy choices.
The next sections analyze the relationship between corruption and the size of shadow econ-
omy. First, a simple theoretical model is developed to examine the link. Second, the question
is approached empirically. The contribution of the study is to recognize that there are di¤erent
types of corruption and that these might have di¤erent e¤ects on the economy.
3 Corruption and Shadow Economy: A Simple Model
As discussed above, most, if not all, countries are a¤ected by corruption, even if the intensity
varies between countries. Previous research on the subject has emphasized that economic de-
velopment plays a role here, as does cultural heritage of a country. A frequently neglected issue
is that there are di¤erent kinds of corrupt practices in addition to petty vs. grand corruption
and centralized vs. decentralized corruption. Particularly, the type of corruption prevalent in
developing countries might di¤er from that of industrialized countries. What makes this rele-
vant is that di¤erent kinds of corruption might have di¤erent consequences. In this section, the
interest lies on two forms of corruption: rst, the case where rms must pay bribes in order to
get projects or licenses and second, the case where rms pay bribes in order to reduce the taxes
they have to pay. Both cases fall under the denition of corruption as the exercise of public
power for private gain, but it seems likely that the former type is more common in developed
countries and the latter in developing countries, although both may also occur simultaneously.
At a deeper level, the di¤erences could be caused by di¤erences in institutional quality.
The model economy consists of two sectors: formal (F) and informal (S). In the spirit of
the aforementioned denition of shadow economy, informal sector is composed of all those rms
that avoid paying taxes on total revenue and fail therefore to contribute to nancing of public
spending (which is, for simplicity, not incorporated in the model). Each rm bases its choice of
sector on prot maximization. A key assumption is that rms can freely choose the sector to
operate in, but they can only operate in one sector.8 It is also assumed that labor is indi¤erent
between the two sectors, if both sectors pay equal wages, and that labor cannot a¤ord not to
work for a shadow-economy rm even if the wage was lower there than in the formal economy.
The focus is rst on the case where bribes are necessary in order to get projects or licences,
and then on the case where corruption is a way to lower taxes.
3.1 Bribes to Get Projects or Licenses
3.1.1 Formal Sector
In the formal sector, rms have to pay taxes  2 (0; 1) on total revenue. The proceeds from
taxation are used to nance infrastructure and public-sector institutions. In addition, corrupt
government o¢ cials may demand bribes for their services e.g. if licenses are required to operate
8Friedman et al. (2000) develop a model in which an entrepreneur can divert a chosen proportion of his
resources to shadow economy.
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a business. The bribe that has to be paid is a constant fraction of the turnover of the rm9 . The
level of corruption, c, is exogenous, which emphasizes the roots corruption has in culture and
history as well as the self-reinforcing nature of the phenomenon.10 Modeling corruption as a kind
of tax leakage connects its e¤ects to the turnover of a rm to highlight, that the size of a rm
has an impact on the scope of the e¤ects of corruption (Beck et al. 2005). The total amount of
corruption-related payments depends in addition on a rm-specic feature i, which is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1: some rms are better equipped to deal with corruption and manage
to pay less. Possible interpretations for i are political connectedness (higher i implying worse
connections) or factors related to rm size (with i decreasing with the rm size). The results of
Choi and Thum (2005) support this formulation of rm-size (or political connectedness) dualism
in the economy: in their model, "the largest informal sector rm is smaller than the smallest
formal sector rm". Also Dabla-Norris et al. (2006) nd rm size to be negatively correlated
with the propensity to go informal.11
The production function is Yi = Li , and the prot function for the formal-sector rm of
type i is:
F = (1     ci)PLi  WLi, (1)
with 0 <  < 1. P is the price level, Li is the labor employed by rm i, and W is the nominal
wage rate, which is thought to incorporate social security payments. Below, W is normalized at
1. At the optimum, a formal-sector rm then produces
Y F = [(1     ci)P )] 

 1 : (2)
3.1.2 Informal Sector
Shadow-economy rms face an e¤ective penalty rate of q(c)   . The assumption of the relative
size of q(c) and  is made for now to exclude the situation in which all the rms choose to enter
shadow economy.12 The penalty rate reects e.g. payments to local police and bureaucrats: the
larger the turnover of a rm, the more it has to pay in order to stay in shadow economy. The
payments to police can be made to guarantee protection that would otherwise be available to
formal-sector rms only13 , while bureaucrats may demand bribes for not reporting about the
rm. Although it is not assumed that the rm-specic feature i loses its signicance in the
shadow economy, it is assumed that its impact is incorporated into q(c). As in Loayza (1997),
the revenues collected through the e¤ective penalty rate are used to nance the governments
enforcement system. It is also assumed that high corruption decreases q, i.e. q0(c) < 0. This is
9Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Choi and Thum (2005) also model corruption through license fees, even if in
their cases the size of the bribe is not related to the turnover of the rm. In contrast, Friedman et al. (2000) use
a deadweight over-regulation or bureaucracy cost per unit of output. This could, as they state, also be referred
to as corruption.
10Corruption might be self-reinforcing, so that long tradition of high corruption or a culture in which corrupt
practices are the customary way of operating might explain the persistence of corruption. The theoretical
background of this idea is discussed by Bardhan (1997) and Aidt (2003), who nd that the higher level of
corruption in some countries might result from multiple equilibria. According to the theory, one equilibrium is a
high-corruption equilibrium, while the level of corruption is lower in the other equilibrium. Thus a history of high
corruption might imply high corruption also in the future. Empirically, multiple equilibria have been explained
by cultural determinants such as the level of trust among people (La Porta et al. 1997), religion (Alesina et
al. 2003, La Porta et al. 1997, La Porta et al. 1999, and Treisman 2000), the level of hierarchy in the society
(Husted 1999), ethnic and linguistic fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003, La Porta et al. 1999, and Treisman
2000), and gender equality (Swamy et al. 2001 and Dollar et al. 1999). In the model developed here, bureaucrats
understand that they could lower future corruption by their actions, thereby beneting the society as a whole,
but they are not willing to give up the extra revenue they get in the form of bribes.
11The results of Dabla-Norris et al. (2006) imply in addition that nance constraints make small rms to
choose the informal sector, while legal obstacles are a more important cause to large rms.
12 In general, both  and q(c) are higher in industrialized countries than in developing economies.
13Another aspect that could be taken into account when comparing the returns in formal and informal sectors
is that informal-sector rms cannot take full advantage of goods provided by the government. See Loayza (1997).
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the case at least if each rm is in the territory of one corrupt bureaucrat (or police).14 The higher
the level of corruption, the less the bureaucrat has to worry about getting caught of accepting
bribes. Furthermore, the option to bribe superiors decreases the expected punishment even
when caught. The bureaucrat or the police will therefore accept lower payment when the level
of corruption in the society is high. Even if the government may have some control over q in
the long run e.g. through legislation, it is assumed that the current q has been set in the past.
Informal-sector prot is
S = [1  q(c)]PLi   Li; (3)
with wages again normalized at 1. In accordance with the formal sector, optimal informal-sector
production is
Y S = f[1  q(c)]Pg 

 1 : (4)
3.1.3 Impact on Shadow Economy Size
As discussed above, a crucial feature of the model is that rms di¤er with respect to a rm-
specic characteristic i. Setting optimal formal-sector prot equal to optimal informal-sector
prot makes it possible to dene the level of i at which a rm is indi¤erent between formal and
shadow economy. If i is smaller than (or equal to) this level , the rm enters the formal sector.
Otherwise, it enters the informal economy. Thus  is the size of the formal economy:
1 =
q(c)  
c
: (5)
Here c > q    , which means that  2 (0; 1). It was, after all, assumed earlier that q   .
As expected, @1@ =   1c < 0, meaning that a higher tax rate on total revenue leads to a larger
shadow economy. Also, @1@q =
1
c > 0, so that the institutional e¤ects are also taken into
account: the e¤ective penalty rate, which partly reects the e¢ ciency of authorities as well as
general regulations, decreases the scope of informal activities. These factors are in line with the
literature.15
The most interesting result concerns corruption:
@1
@c
=
q0(c)c+    q
c2
(6)
which is negative because it was assumed that q0(c) < 0 and that q(c)   . Thus, the higher
the level of corruption, and the higher the bribes necessary to get o¢ cial-sector projects, the
larger the shadow economy. Corruption and shadow economy are therefore complements.
3.1.4 But Wages and Social Security Payments Are Lower in Informal Sector
The situation becomes less straightforward, if the informal sector production function is altered
to account for the fact that, from the point of view of a rm, the total of informal sector wages
and social security payments is lower than in the formal sector. In fact, many informal sector
jobs, particularly in developing economies, are of low quality, and the wage may well be low
enough not to bring the worker above the poverty line. And, of course, a rm operating in shadow
economy escapes social security payments completely. A realistic model should, therefore, assign
a lower W to shadow economy. In such a case,
S = [1  q(c)]PLi   Li; (7)
14Also Bliss and Di Tella (1997) discuss such a case. In reality, jurisdictions of bureaucrats may well be
overlapping.
15According to Friedman et al. (2000), higher tax rates might in fact be associated with smaller shadow
economy, because the benets of remaining o¢ cial outweigh the costs of high taxation in rich, less corrupt
countries.
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where  < 1. As lower informal sector wages now compensate partly for the e¤ective penalty
rate, it does not have to hold that q   . After this addition, the size of the formal sector is
2 =
1     [1  q(c)]  
c
: (8)
Because  and  2 (0; 1),   > 1. The size of the formal sector  2 (0; 1) i¤ 0  1     
[1  q(c)]    c. This is assumed.
Taxation and the e¤ective penalty rate now a¤ect the size of the formal economy as follows:
@2
@
=  1
c
< 0
and
@2
@q
=
 
c
> 0:
The e¤ect of taxation remains unchanged, but the impact of the e¤ective penalty rate is
magnied by the presence of , and the positive impact of good institutions on formal-sector
size is larger. The e¤ect of corruption on the size of the formal sector is
@2
@c
=
q0(c) c  1     [1  q(c)]  	
c2
< 0: (9)
Because the rst term in the numerator is negative and 1     [1  q(c)]   is positive by
assumption, corruption has a negative impact on the size of formal economy and a positive e¤ect
on shadow economy size, implying again that corruption and shadow economy are complements.
Therefore, the result obtained in the simpler framework of the previous section also holds in
this more realistic setting.
The impact of  is
@2
@
=
 [1  q(c)]   1
c
> 0:
meaning that the smaller informal-sector wage and social security payments are relative to
those in the o¢ cial sector, the smaller the o¢ cial sector is.
3.2 Bribes to Lower Taxes
Bribes paid to get projects are not the only form of corruption. Bribes can also be paid to avoid
or lower taxes. This section concentrates on such a case. More specically, rms pay bribes
to lower the tax rate they face. However, they are not able to totally escape taxes and stay
therefore, according to the denition of shadow economy, within the formal economy.
3.2.1 Framework 1
The framework presented here is based on the assumption that a rm can a¤ect the tax rate it
faces in reality, that is  , by bribing bureaucrats. The o¢ cial tax rate is still predetermined and
xed. Moreover, the more corrupt the society is (i.e. the higher c is), the lower is the tax rate
faced by a rm:  0(c) < 0. The relationship follows simply from the type of corruption analyzed
in this section. In accordance with the previous section, the formal sector prot function can
now be modeled as (the wage is again normalized at 1):
F = [1  (c)  ci]PLi   Li. (10)
In this formulation, the rm-specic feature i does not a¤ect the tax rate, it only a¤ects the
magnitude of bribes. The prot function of a rm operating within the shadow economy is the
same as in (7):
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S = [1  q(c)]PLi   Li (11)
meaning that the size of the formal economy is familiar from (8) with the exception that the
tax rate now depends on the level of corruption:
3 =
1  (c)  [1  q(c)]  
c
: (12)
It is again assumed that 0  1  (c)  [1  q(c)]    c. The impacts of taxation, e¤ective
penalty rate, corruption, and the measure of wage and social security di¤erential between o¢ cial
and uno¢ cial sectors on the size of the formal economy are then
@3
@
=  1
c
< 0;
@3
@q
=
 
c
> 0;
@3
@c
=
  0(c) + q0(c)  c  1  (c)  [1  q(c)]  	
c2
? 0 (13)
and
@3
@
=
 [1  q(c)]   1
c
> 0:
The rst two e¤ects are familiar from above, as is also the last one. As to (13), the only
change in comparison to (9) is the addition of   0(c)c to the numerator. As this is positive by
assumption, corruption could now, in an extreme case16 , have a positive impact on the size of
the formal economy. Even if the impact was not positive, it would still be less severe than in
the case where bribes were paid to get projects. In other words, the greater the extent to which
a rm can use bribes to mitigate the negative e¤ects of taxation, the smaller is the willingness
of the rm to go informal.
3.2.2 Framework 2
Formal-sector prot could also be modeled so that the rm-specic feature i a¤ects the sum of
the tax rate and bribes:
F = f1  [(c) + c] igPLi   Li. (14)
The size of the formal economy is then
4 =
1  [1  q(c)]  
(c) + c
; (15)
which is between 0 and 1 i¤ 0  1  [1  q(c)]    (c) + c. This condition coincides with
the one presented in the context of framework 1. In comparison to (12), the formal economy is
now larger.17 This is natural, because in framework 2 the rm-specic feature i helps to lower
the tax rate as well as bribes. The e¤ects of the di¤erent factors on the size of the formal
economy are then
@4
@
=  1  [1  q(c)] 
 
[(c) + c]
2 < 0;
16The impact is positive i¤ j  0(c)cj > q0(c) c  1  (c)  [1  q(c)]  	. The stronger the reaction of
the actual tax rate to higher corruption, the more likely this is.
173   4 = [(c)+c]f1 (c) [1 q(c)]
 g cf1 [1 q(c)] g
[(c)+c]c
=
(c)f1 (c) [1 q(c)]  cg
[(c)+c]c
 0 because 0 
1  (c)  [1  q(c)]    c by assumption.
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@4
@q
=
 
(c) + c
> 0;
@4
@c
=
q0(c)  [(c) + c]  1  [1  q(c)]  	 [ 0(c) + 1]
[(c) + c]
2 ? 0 (16)
and
@4
@
=
 [1  q(c)]   1
(c) + c
> 0:
The impact of the rm characteristic on taxation weakens the e¤ects of q and  on formal-
economy size. The rst term of the numerator in (16) is again negative, but the second term
can be either positive or negative depending on the term  0(c)+1. If  0(c) <  1, i.e. the actual
tax rate reacts strongly to corruption, the impact of corruption on the size of formal economy is
ambiguous. In addition, the more the tax rate decreases with the level of corruption, the more
likely it is that the e¤ect on the o¢ cial sector is positive. This could imply that corruption is more
likely to decrease the scope of informal economic activity in countries with poor institutions,
because it is then less risky to bureaucrats to accept bribes and allow small increases in bribes to
decrease the actual tax rate more than in cases where the expected punishment is more severe.
Finally, the smaller the di¤erence in wage and social security payments between the two sectors,
the larger the formal economy is, although this e¤ect is also smaller than in framework 1.
3.3 From the Model to Figures
The model indicates that bribes to lower taxes have a less severe impact on the size of formal
economy than bribes that are paid to get licences. In some extreme cases, the former type of
corruption could actually enlarge formal economy, although the impact of bribes paid to get
licences is always negative. The most important implication of the model, which is also the
point emphasized in this paper, is therefore that the type of corruption matters and that the
consequences of di¤erent corrupt practices may di¤er. This should be taken into account in
empirical analysis. However, because data on di¤erent types of corruption are unavailable, some
assumptions are necessary to tackle the issue. Particularly, it is assumed here that the type
of corruption, and therefore its consequences, are associated with the geographical location of
a country. This can be used as a starting point, because earlier literature (see Gallup et al.
1999 and Sachs 2001, among others) has pointed out that geography can have an impact on e.g.
transportation costs, economic policy choices, and the quality of human resources.
In the next section, the question about the determinants of shadow economy size is analyzed
empirically. In contrast to the model presented above, where it was for simplicity assumed
that the level of corruption was inherited from the previous period, endogeneity of corruption
is recognized and the issue is addressed via using instrumental variables. Another di¤erence
is that the empirical analysis tries to explain the size of shadow economy as percent of o¢ cial
GDP instead of the share of rms choosing to go informal.
4 Corruption and Shadow Economy in Real World
Because estimates of shadow economy sizes have been scarce, the existing empirical literature
on the impact of corruption on the scope of informal economic activity is mostly based on rather
small samples. Therefore, the results of Johnson et al. (1997), based on a cross-section of 15
countries, and Johnson et al. (1998), based on 39 countries, are hardly reliable. A particularly
problematic aspect is that the small number of observations prevents the use of instrumental
variables, even if it was recognized that the level of corruption is endogenous. Similarly, Loayza
(1997) can be thought to show statistical correlation instead of causal relations (Schneider and
Enste 2000). All in all, the results of the earlier literature are conicting. This could be partly
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explained by another weakness of the most studies so far: they do not account for the fact that
the consequences of corruption might di¤er between countries. This issue has been brought
up by Dreher and Schneider (2006), who point out that the type of corruption dominant in
high-income countries mainly manifests itself as bribes, which are paid to be able to engage
in more o¢ cial economic activities. In contrast, Dreher and Schneider claim, shadow economy
and corruption are more likely to reinforce each other in low-income countries, implying a
complementary relationship between the two. The empirical results of Dreher and Schneider
give some tentative support for this reasoning.
Other factors that have been found to play a role in determining shadow economy size in-
clude tax and social security burden, labor market restrictions and the strength and e¢ ciency
of government institutions and regulations. Another important determinant is tax morale and,
more generally, attitudes towards shadow economy (Schneider 2006). Loayza (1997) nds that
tax burden and labor market restrictions have a positive impact on the size of shadow economy,
while high-quality government institutions have the opposite e¤ect. The results of Johnson et
al. (1999) indicate that the type of taxation matters as well. Because their results imply, in ad-
dition, that ine¤ective and discretionary application of a tax regime might have more signicant
consequences than the mere level of taxes, and that discretionary government regulations overall
increase informal economic activities, taxation should perhaps be handled more widely as the
combined burden of taxes and regulation in the o¢ cial economy. In the same spirit, Johnson et
al. (1997) and Friedman et al. (2000) conclude that the intensity of regulation leads to a higher
share of uno¢ cial economy of o¢ cial economy. Johnson et al. (1998) emphasize, furthermore,
that enforcement of regulation is much more important than the extent of regulation as such.
Friedman et al. (2000) do not nd any evidence on the impact of high tax rates but conclude
instead that bureaucracy and corruption drive rms into shadow economy. Also, there is some
evidence of multiple equilibria (Johnson et al. 1999): in the good equilibrium, the burden of
taxation and regulation is light, tax revenue is high, corruption is under control and shadow
economy is small. In the bad equilibrium, the situation is the opposite.
4.1 Data Description
Because reliable panel data on shadow economy sizes are unavailable, the analysis is based on
a cross-section of countries. The data are averaged over 2000-2002 in order to minimize the
impact of yearly uctuations. Descriptive statistics and the list of countries included in the
regressions are presented in Appendix.
Shadow economy The dependent variable is the size of shadow economy in percent of o¢ cial
GDP from Schneider (2006). Estimates are based on dynamic multiple indicators multiple
causes model (DYMIMIC) and currency demand method (see Schneider 2006 for a more detailed
description and Schneider and Enste 2000 for a discussion on di¤erent methods for estimating
the size of shadow economy) and are available for 145 countries between 1999 and 2003. The
sample is, therefore, much larger than most of the earlier studies have had at their disposal.
However, because other methods have not been used for an equally large sample of countries, it
is di¢ cult to test for the robustness of the results. Moreover, other estimates of shadow economy
sizes are mainly available for the early 1990s. Therefore, and despite the disadvantages of using
a di¤erent time period, the gures for the years 1989 and 1990 from Schneider and Enste (2000)
are also used. The estimates based on physical input method are chosen, because they are based
on quite di¤erent data than the estimates of Schneider (2006): physical input method relies on
gures on electricity consumption.
Corruption An important feature of an index is strong comparability across countries. As
corruption is impossible to measure accurately, data on corruption are usually based on sub-
jective assessments on the level of corruption in di¤erent countries. Among others, Treisman
(2000) nds the indices of perceived corruption useful: the ratings are usually highly correlated
with each other and also across time, and the subjective evaluations on which the indices are
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based can themselves a¤ect economic behavior. On the other hand, the use of perceptions-based
measures of corruption has been criticized, because they might be correlated with the quality
of a countrys institutions instead of its actual degree of corruption (Dreher et al. 2004).
A widely used measure of corruption is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Trans-
parency International (2006). The index measures the perceptions of the extent of corruption as
seen by di¤erent groups such as business people, risk analysts and general public. Evaluation is
done by non-resident experts and business leaders as well as resident business leaders. The rst
version of Corruption Index was compiled in 1995 for 41 countries, while the number of countries
had risen to 159 by 2005.18 Another often used perceptions-based index of corruption is that of
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (2006). The index, based on subjective evaluation
of corruption within the political system of a country, has been popular in cross-country studies,
because it is the only index that provides a consistent time series back to the early 1980s. Due
to the criticism against perceptions-based indices, I also use the index developed by Dreher et
al. (2004). The index is based on a structural model and is only available for years 1980, 1985,
1990 and 1997, meaning that the missing years have to be intrapolated and extrapolated. In
both perceptions-based indices, a higher score means lower corruption, while the index of Dreher
et al. has been built so that a higher score means higher corruption. Because this index is in
addition smaller in absolute values, I multiply it by -10 to simplify the interpretation of results.
A particularly problematic aspect from the point of view of this study is that all the indices
available measure corruption only at some general level. Thus, it is not possible to directly
distinguish between di¤erent types of corruption. But, as Dreher and Schneider (2006) point
out, it is very likely that the income level of a country is associated with the type of corruption
prevalent in that country. The problem with income level is, however, that it is endogenous. On
the other hand, if the views of Gallup et al. (1999) and Sachs (2001) are correct, the geographic
location of a country plays a non-negligible role in economic development, meaning that it should
also have an impact on the type and consequences of corruption. The empirical analysis of this
section will, therefore, use an interaction term of corruption and geography to nd out whether
corruption indeed does have a di¤erent impact on shadow economy in di¤erent countries.
Taxation One possible proxy for taxation is the measure of scal burden from the Heritage
Foundation (2006). The index is based on average and marginal corporate and income taxation
and increases with more intense government interference in the economy, as do all the factors
from the Heritage Foundation. Other options comprise the share of tax revenue of GDP from
the World Bank (2006) and the measures of taxation from Gwartney and Lawson (2006).
E¤ective penalty rate The magnitude of the e¤ective penalty rate is largely determined
by institutions and their quality. Therefore, suitable proxies include rule of law and govern-
ment e¤ectiveness from Kaufmann et al. (2005): the former measures the quality of contract
enforcement, the police, the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence, while the latter
concentrates on the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery.
Other candidates for measuring the quality of institutions comprise bureaucracy quality and law
and order from ICRG (2006) and the index of legal system and property rights from Gwartney
and Lawson (2006).
Wage and social security di¤erential between formal sector and shadow economy
Many of the measures concerning labor market regulations coincide with the measures of the
general burden of regulation: the index on price and wage regulations from the Heritage Foun-
dation (2006) and the measure of minimum wage regulation from Gwartney and Lawson (2006)
are relevant here, as is the index of labor market regulations from the latter. Bearing in mind
the discussion on the signicance of the combined burden of taxes and regulation, it becomes
twice as important to control for the regulation in the labor market.
18The index presented in Kaufmann et al. (2005) is also based on multiple surveys, some of which are the
same as those used in compiling the Corruption Perceptions Index.
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Additional instruments As is commonly done in studies on the consequences of corruption,
I control for the log of per capita GDP. To avoid further endogeneity issues, I lag GDP per capita
by one period so that the average of years 1997-1999 appears in the regressions. In addition,
I use ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, countrys geographic location and legal
origin of the country as instruments for corruption. Geographic location is measured either as
the fraction of the countrys area that is located in tropics or the absolute value of the countrys
latitude. The former has been found to a¤ect e.g. e¤ectiveness of development aid, while the
latter is commonly used in cross-country studies of growth.19
This paper su¤ers from the same problem as most of the empirical analyses on the impacts
of corruption: it is di¢ cult to nd instruments that would only explain corruption and not the
size of shadow economy directly. Because panel data on shadow economy size are unavailable,
it is not possible to try to solve the problem by focusing on the growth of shadow economy, as
has been done in the context of economic growth (see section 2.2). It is, therefore, assumed
that the di¤erent types of fractionalization and geography a¤ect the size of shadow economy
only through their impact on corruption. Validity of this exclusion restriction can be disputed,
but it has been a convention in the literature on corruption to account for these factors, while
the literature on shadow economy has focused on other factors. Moreover, even if it can be
claimed that fractionalization could drive minority groups into shadow economy, it seems that
bribes, and therefore corruption, are always involved. And although geography has been found
to signicantly a¤ect the quality of institutions and, thus, the level of corruption (e.g. La Porta
et al. 1999), it seems reasonable to assume that the impact of geography on the size of shadow
economy is already reected in the other instruments.
4.2 Empirical Analysis
Because the level of corruption is endogenous, instrumental variables (IV) have to be used to
analyze the impact of corruption on the size of shadow economy. An additional issue is whether
it would be better to use GMM estimator rather than the simple IV estimator. To answer the
question, a test for homoskedasticity developed by Pagan and Hall (1983) was used, with the
result that the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity was not rejected in any of the cases discussed
below. According to Baum et al. (2003), the result implies that IV is preferable to GMM, which
can have poor small sample properties. After all, GMM requires estimates of fourth moments,
which should be based on a large sample to be reasonable, as Hayashi (2000, p. 215) points out.
Furthermore, due to the small sample size, results presented below are based on small-sample
statistics.
To begin with, the aim is to explore the relationship between corruption and shadow economy
worldwide. Later, the goal shifts to nding di¤erences in the impact of corruption between
countries.
4.2.1 Traditional Way of Doing Things
Even when accounting for endogeneity of corruption, traditional analysis has not interacted
corruption with other variables. This section uses the same technique, rst for all countries
and then for high-income countries and other countries separately. For robustness, the same
regressions are estimated for all three corruption indices.
The two-equation econometric specication is
Corri = 1 + 2GDPi + 3Taxi + 4Institi + 5WPi + 6LoBi + 7LoFi (17)
+8LoSi + 9LoGi + 10Efi + 11Rfi + 12Geogi + 1;i
Shadowi = 1 + 2Corri + 3GDPi + 4Taxi + 5Institi + 6WPi
+7LoBi + 8LoFi + 9LoSi + 10LoGi + 2;i
19See Roodman (2004), Gallup et al. (1999), and Sachs (2001).
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where Corri and Shadowi are the level of corruption and the size of shadow economy in
country i, respectively, s and s are the coe¢ cients to be estimated, and 1 and 2 are stochastic
error terms. Excluded instruments only used in the rst-stage regression explaining the level of
corruption are ethno-linguistic fractionalization Ef and tropical area fraction of a country Geog
from Roodman (2004), and religious fractionalization Rf from Alesina et al. (2003). It is
assumed throughout, that fractionalization factors and geography only a¤ect shadow economy
size through their impact on corruption. As discussed above, this assumption is quite strong. It
is, therefore, necessary to be careful with causal relationships. The set of included instruments
used in both equations comprises log of GDP per capita lagged by one period (GDP ) from the
World Bank (2006), scal burden Tax, quality of institutions Instit and wage di¤erential WP ,
as well as dummies for the legal origin from La Porta et al. (1999). LoB stands for British
legal origin, LoF for French, LoS for socialist, and LoG for German.20 The measures of scal
burden, institutional quality and wage di¤erential come various sources.
According to the rst-stage results, the quality of institutions correlates negatively with
the level of corruption. This is in line with the earlier literature. Somewhat surprisingly, the
negative connection between GDP per capita and corruption does not seem to be equally strong,
even if it is signicant in many of the regressions. It is, however, possible that the proxy for
institutional quality partly captures the connection traditionally perceived between economic
development and corruption. It is also noteworthy that the index of Dreher et al. (2004) seems
to di¤er from the perceptions-bases indices with respect to the results and their implications.
The second-stage regressions imply that corruption could, in some rare cases, play a role
in determining the scope of informal economic activity. However, depending on the corruption
index and the set of instruments, corruption seems to enlarge shadow economy in some cases,
while also the opposite e¤ect is possible. Other factors seem to be far more important: strong
rule of law, high GDP per capita in the previous period and strict regulation of wages and prices
lead to smaller shadow economy. Of these, the connection between wage and price regulation and
shadow economy size seems to be the strongest. Trying di¤erent combinations of the alternative
proxies for scal burden, institutional quality and other instruments shows that the instruments
and the corruption index in use can have a tremendous e¤ect on the results. Moreover, statistical
tests indicate that many of the regressions are problematic. All in all, it is not that surprising
that the implications of the earlier literature tend to be conicting.
The rst way to address the question of whether the e¤ects of corruption might di¤er between
countries is to run IV regressions separately for high-income and other countries. Keeping the
sample size in mind, it should not come as a surprise that the results are not very robust
and that there are often problems with test statistics. Several regressions for both groups of
countries indicate, however, that corruption has an increasing impact on shadow economy size.21
Regressions with insignicant corruption in second stage are even more numerous. Therefore,
the division of countries into high-income and other countries neither supports nor discredits the
hypothesis of the di¤erent consequences of corruption in di¤erent countries. The next section
examines the issue further and introduces an interaction term between corruption and geography.
4.2.2 Does Geography Matter?
As mentioned, previous empirical literature on the impact of corruption on the size of shadow
economy has hardly tried to account for di¤erent types of corruption. This section attempts to
ll the void by assuming that the type of corruption prevalent in a country is associated with
the geographic location of the country. Therefore, an interaction term corruptiongeography is
introduced.22 Here, geography is mostly approximated by the tropical area fraction of a country,
because the absolute value of a countrys latitude proves not to be signicant. The inclusion of
the endogenous interaction term is a cause for building new instruments. The principle followed
20Scandinavian legal origin is dropped because of collinearity.
21 Interestingly, the division of countries into two groups strengthens this impact in comparison to the analysis
with all countries, where the sign of corruption tended to vary in second-stage regressions.
22Unlike income level, geography is exogenous and can therefore be used in this manner.
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is that if a variable such as ethnic fractionalization is a valid instrument for corruption, then
the product of this variable and geography is a valid instrument for corruption  geography.
There are now two endogenous terms: corruption (Corr) and the product of corruption and
geography (CorrGeog). Because the endogenous regressors are projected on all the instruments
in IV regressions, three equations to be estimated are
Corri = 1 + 2GDPi + 3Taxi + 4Institi + 5WPi + 6LoBi + 7LoFi
+8LoSi + 9LoGi + 10Efi + 11Rfi + 12Geogi
+13EfGeogi + 14RfGeogi + 1;i
CorrGeogi = 1 + 2GDPi + 3Taxi + 4Institi + 5WPi + 6LoBi + 7LoFi (18)
+8LoSi + 9LoGi + 10Efi + 11Rfi + 12Geogi
+13EfGeogi + 14RfGeogi + 2;i
Shadowi = 1 + 2Corri + 3CorrGeogi + 4GDPi + 5Taxi + 6Institi + 7WPi
+8LoBi + 9LoFi + 10LoSi + 11LoGi + 3;i
where Corri stands for the level of corruption in country i and Shadow refers again to the
scope of informal economic activity. The coe¢ cients to be estimated are now denoted by s,
s and s, while 1, 2 and 3 are the stochastic error terms. Excluded instruments comprise
ethno-linguistic (Ef) and religious fractionalization (Rf), tropical area fraction of a country
(Geog) and the interaction terms of these (EfGeog and RfGeog), while included instruments
are composed of lagged (log of) GDP per capita (GDP ), scal burden (Tax), institutional
quality (Instit), wage and price regulation (WP ) and dummies for British (LoB), French (LoF ),
Socialist (LoS), and German (LoG) legal origins.
The rst-stage results imply again that the connection between the quality of institutions
and the level of corruption is the most important one, while the connection between GDP per
capita and the level of corruption is somewhat weaker. Also religious fractionalization seems to
be associated with a lower level of corruption, as are various other indicators in di¤erent cases.
All other connections are less robust than the one between rule of law and corruption, though.
The second-stage results for a representative set of instruments are presented in Table 1:
the rst regression uses CPI, the second ICRGs index of political corruption and the third that
based on a structural model of Dreher et al. (2004). The results with CPI and ICRGs index
imply that wage and price regulation signicantly a¤ects the size of the shadow economy at
ten percent risk level: the negative coe¢ cient implies that higher regulation leads to a smaller
shadow economy. It is somewhat surprising that scal burden and institutional quality do not
seem to play any role, although the most interesting result of Table 1, at least from the point
of view of this paper, concerns the joint impact of the level of corruption and the tropical area
fraction of a country. All three regressions indicate that the impact of corruption on the size of
shadow economy is higher in tropics: the higher the share of a countrys area located in tropics,
the more a certain level of corruption increases informal economic activity. According to the
results, corruption does not have on impact on the size of shadow economy outside tropics.
Also, bearing in mind that all the corruption indices decrease with the level of corruption, the
regressions imply that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in tropics, i.e. the lower
the level of corruption (the higher the value of the index), the larger shadow economy is. This
supports the conclusion drawn in section 3.2.2: if corruption and shadow economy are more
likely to be substitutes in a country with poor-quality institutions, the relationship between the
two should be negatively precisely in tropics, where the quality of institutions tends to be low.
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Table 1. IV regression results with interaction terms: the impact of corruption on shadow economy size
regression 1 regression 2 regression 3
Corruption (Transparency International) -5.859
(1.63)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 1.7
(2.00)**
Corruption (ICRG) -6.679
(1.51)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 3.633
(2.49)**
Corruption (Dreher et al.) -7.18
(1.36)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 5.213
(2.12)**
(Log of ) GDP per capita, lagged -0.54 -1.556 -1.42
(0.32) (1.26) (0.73)
Fiscal burden (Heritage Foundation) 0.868 1.823 1.89
(0.35) (0.78) (0.57)
Rule of law (Kaufmann et al.) 1.715 -2.717 -3.463
(0.25) (0.63) (0.87)
Wages and prices (Heritage Foundation) -3.952 -6.218 -2.449
(1.85)* (3.07)*** (0.91)
British legal origin (La Porta et al.) -12.216 -15.577 -21.15
(1.79)* (1.77)* (1.45)
French legal origin (La Porta et al.) -12.339 -12.823 -18.234
(1.69)* (1.68)* (1.31)
Socialist legal origin (La Porta et al.) -18.22 -17.238 -20.542
(2.12)** (2.02)** (1.5)
German legal origin (La Porta et al.) -17.986 -17.333 -3.507
(1.91)* (1.83)* (0.4)
Constant 80.122 82.99 75.996
(4.05)*** (4.36)*** (2.77)***
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Observations 79 95 81
R-squared 0.64 0.63 0.49
First-stage F-test P-value (corruption) 0.0021 0.0043 0.2677
First-stage F-test P-value (corruption * tropical area fraction) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio statistic (P-value) 0.0002 0.0081 0.4508
Sargan statistic (P-value) 0.9023 0.8300 0.8093
The signicant and large negative coe¢ cients of legal origin dummies in regressions 1 and 2
of Table 1 seem to imply that Scandinavian legal origin, which is used as the reference group, is
associated with a larger shadow economy. Because the three-year averages of shadow economy
sizes for Scandinavian countries are all rather small at below 20 percent of GDP (Schneider
2006), this is counterintuitive. A part of the potential explanation is given by the negative sign of
corruption in all three regressions, even if the coe¢ cients are insignicant: because Scandinavian
countries are typically given high scores (implying low corruption) in these indices, the negative
impact on shadow economy size through this channel could be large.
Table 1 also depicts the results of Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio test for
the relevance of instruments.23 The rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the model is
identied and that the instruments are relevant. The di¤erent nature of the index by Dreher et
al. (2004) is again reected in the results, which suggest that the instruments are not suitable for
this index at 10 percent risk level even if they are that for the other two indices. The P-values of
Sargan statistic, where the hypothesis tested is that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated
with residuals, are likewise presented. Sargan statistic assumes conditional homoskedasticity,
which does not seem to be a problem here: Pagan and Hall (1983) -test does not reject the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity in any of the regressions.24
Replacing the measure of scal burden from the Heritage Foundation (2006) by that of the
World Bank (2006) results in Table 2. Legal origin dummies are now insignicant, but the
23See Baum et al. (2003) for detailed desriptions of the tests.
24Results are available upon request.
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implications are otherwise the same as in Table 1: strict wage and price regulation is associated
with a smaller shadow economy, whereas the joint impact of corruption and tropical area fraction
of a country is signicant and positive in all three regressions. After this change in the set of
instruments, the instruments are relevant at ten percent risk level also in regression 3.
Table 2. IV regression results with interaction terms: the impact of corruption on shadow economy size
regression 1 regression 2 regression 3
Corruption (Transparency International) -3.067
(0.5)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 1.528
(1.72)*
Corruption (ICRG) -3.676
(0.66)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 3.057
(1.85)*
Corruption (Dreher et al.) -1.413
(0.44)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 3.869
(2.17)**
(Log of ) GDP per capita, lagged -1.4 -1.853 -1.289
(0.73) (1.21) (0.64)
Fiscal burden (World Bank) -0.025 0.033 0.011
(0.11) (0.17) (0.06)
Rule of law (Kaufmann et al.) -1.488 -3.635 -4.868
(0.11) (0.63) (1.4)
Wages and prices (Heritage Foundation) -5.509 -5.526 -4.786
(1.9)* (2.58)** (1.91)*
British legal origin (La Porta et al.) -9.663 -10.964 -9.131
(1.29) (1.23) (0.97)
French legal origin (La Porta et al.) -5.002 -5.436 -2.367
(0.58) (0.7) (0.26)
Socialist legal origin (La Porta et al.) -9.873 -8.848 -6.706
(0.88) (0.91) (0.66)
German legal origin (La Porta et al.) -11.42 -9.965 -5.752
(0.83) (1.06) (0.58)
Constant 75.891 75.204 57.836
(2.30)** (2.87)*** (2.28)**
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Observations 57 65 58
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.65
First-stage F-test P-value (corruption) 0.2692 0.0488 0.1761
First-stage F-test P-value (corruption * tropical area fraction) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio statistic (P-value) 0.0958 0.1042 0.0997
Sargan statistic (P-value) 0.2826 0.2727 0.2209
4.2.3 Robustness Checks
Alternative instruments Section 4.1 listed alternative proxies for the components of the
theoretical model of Section 3. The result on the signicance of the joint impact of corruption
and tropical area fraction seems to hold with various other measures of institutional quality
combined with other indicators of scal burden and price and wage regulation. The negative
connection between wage and price regulation and the scope of informal economic activity seems
to be equally robust. Otherwise, corruption sometimes appears in regressions with a signicant
negative coe¢ cient, and also other factors such as institutional quality are signicant in single
regressions, but these results are far from robust.
As discussed above, other estimates of shadow economy sizes are mainly available for the
early 1990s. The sample sizes are considerably smaller: the gures based on physical input
method are available for 59 countries in 1990. Moreover, many of the series used as instruments
in the above analysis do not go back to early 1990s, and the changes in the set of instruments
due to the data availability problems result in large statistical problems, which undermine the
signicance of the regressions. All in all, the result on the joint signicance of corruption and
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tropical area fraction of a country does not seem to be robust to the use of shadow economy size
estimates based on physical input method. It is, nevertheless, di¢ cult to state the reason for
this. First, it could follow from the statistical problems due to the few series and observations
available. Second, a closer look at the countries for which physical input method estimates
are available reveals that not that many of them are in tropics. This might, naturally, a¤ect
the results. Third, it could be that the relationship between corruption and shadow economy
was di¤erent in 1990 than it was a decade later. It is, however, impossible to deduce which
explanation is true based on the available data.
Recent literature on growth has paid plenty of attention to endowment of natural resources,
debating whether so-called resource curse exists. The issue has been discussed in the context
of corruption by Leite and Weidmann (1999), who argue that natural resource abundance is
an important determinant of the level of corruption. Therefore, measures of natural resource
abundance are added to the set of instruments.25 In contrast to the conclusion of Leite and
Weidmann, the results imply that natural resources do not correlate with the level of corruption.
Instead, they might play a role in determining the size of shadow economy. Particularly, it
seems that the share of food and agricultural exports of total merchandise exports (World Bank
2006) is associated with a larger shadow economy. This connection does not seem to, however,
overrule the joint impact of corruption and tropical area fraction on shadow economy size.
Other measures of natural resource abundance used do not seem to have a signicant impact
on corruption or shadow economy. The discussion on whether the natural resource shares of
exports really measure the level of natural resources or something completely else is beyond the
scope of this paper. Whatever the conclusion, interaction terms of corruption and export shares
cannot be used in the analysis, because export shares are endogenous.
Methodological questions Exclusion restrictions have commonly been problematic in IV
regressions with corruption. To test the signicance of the assumptions made here, they are re-
laxed one by one. First, the negative connection between wage and price regulation and the size
of shadow economy seems to be robust to including tropical area fraction in second-stage regres-
sions. The joint impact of corruption and tropical area fraction becomes, however, insignicant.
On the other hand, tropical area fraction does not seem to have any direct connection with the
size of shadow economy either, which implies that it is only necessary to include the variable
in rst-stage regressions. Second, including either ethno-linguistic or religious fractionalization
in second-stage regressions does not a¤ect the joint signicance of corruption and tropical area
fraction or that of wage and price regulation. However, because neither of the fractionalization
measures seems to have a direct impact on the scope of informal economic activity, it seems
justied to keep them as excluded instruments.
The results on the positive and jointly signicant impact of corruption and tropical area frac-
tion and the negative impact of price and wage regulation are robust to dropping the interaction
terms of geography and other excluded instruments from the set of instruments. However, test
statistics are then worse in a clear majority of the cases, which indicates that the interaction
terms are necessary.26
Because instrumenting for the interaction term of endogenous corruption and exogenous
geography is somewhat unorthodox, some might prefer alternative procedures such as boot-
strapping. First, corruption is the dependent variable. The results of this regression are used to
get the predicted level of corruption, c^, which is then interacted with tropical area fraction. In
the second phase, these two predictions are used alongside with the included instruments from
the IV regressions to explain the size of shadow economy. The whole procedure is bootstrapped.
The results presented in Table 3 imply that the conclusions do not change in any major way.
The interaction term of corruption and tropical area fraction is positive and signicant at ve
percent risk level in regressions 2 and 3, while the term is positive and almost signicant at 10
25The measures include 3-year averages of food and agricultural exports and fuel and mineral exports as a
share of total merchandise exports from the World Bank (2006) and per capita subsoil assets, cropland and
pastureland in 2000 from World Bank (2005). The results are available upon request.
26The results are available upon request.
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percent risk level in regression 1. Furthermore, the impact of strict wage and price regulation
on the size of shadow economy seems to be signicant and negative. All in all, bootstrapping
does not give any cause for rejecting the results based on IV regressions.
Table 3. Bootstrapping results: the impact of corruption on shadow economy size
regression 1 regression 2 regression 3
Corruption (Transparency International) -5.132
(1.55)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 1.113
(1.43)
Corruption (ICRG) -4.651
(1.38)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 2.602
(1.96)**
Corruption (Dreher et al.) -6.598
(1.91)
Corruption * tropical area fraction 4.143
(2.33)**
(Log of ) GDP per capita, lagged -0.755 -1.694 -2.021
(0.49) (1.41) (1.37)
Fiscal burden (Heritage Foundation) 0.103 0.744 0.931
(0.04) (0.46) (0.38)
Rule of law (Kaufmann et al.) 0.249 -4.864 -4.572
(0.04) (1.32) (1.54)
Wages and prices (Heritage Foundation) -3.747 -5.91 -3.388
(1.61) (2.68)*** (1.55)
British legal origin (La Porta et al.) -10.46 -12.214 -20.233
(1.94)* (2.07)** (2.28)**
French legal origin (La Porta et al.) -10.828 -10.3 -18.11
(1.69)* (2.25)** (2.10)**
Socialist legal origin (La Porta et al.) -17.582 -15.4 -21.815
(2.11)** (2.23)** (2.18)**
German legal origin (La Porta et al.) -16.604 -14.283 -4.083
(2.31)** (2.35)** (0.28)
Constant 80.693 80.429 86.491
(3.90)*** (4.01)*** (4.12)***
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%)
Observations 79 95 81
Finally, it should perhaps be highlighted again that the result of the joint signicance of
corruption and tropical area fraction cannot be replicated with the absolute value of a countrys
latitude, and is therefore only associated with the tropical area fraction of a country and not
any other measure of geography.
4.3 Empirical Implications
The regressions without interaction terms between corruption and geography seem to indicate
that corruption could play some role in determining the size of shadow economy. Bearing the
conicting results of the earlier literature in mind, it is not surprising that the result does
not seem to be robust to either direction. In fact, the use of di¤erent corruption indices with
di¤erent proxies for institutions and other instruments may, and does, result in opposite results.
Unfortunately, this makes it extremely di¢ cult to verify whether corruption really has di¤erent
consequences in di¤erent countries. Instead, the results indicate that some factors are quite
robust determinants of informal economic activity: higher-quality institutions, higher level of
economic development and stricter wage and price regulation seem to reduce the size of shadow
economy.
Lagged GDP per capita and wage and price regulation continue to be important, when an
interaction term of corruption and tropical area fraction is added to the analysis to account
for the possibly di¤erent consequences of corruption between countries. In addition, the result
on the signicance of corruption  geography seems to be quite robust despite the potentially
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problematic exclusion restriction: the larger the share of a countrys area that is located in
tropics, the larger is the increasing impact of the level of corruption on shadow economy size.
This seems to conrm the idea that discussion on corruption should allow for the possibility
that the consequences of corruption may di¤er in di¤erent parts of the world.
5 Conclusions
Hardly anyone disputes that corruption can have signicant and sometimes severe consequences.
Moreover, corruption tends to be a particularly acute problem in those countries that are already
otherwise worse o¤. It is also alarming that the losses caused by corruption seem to have been
on the increase in various developing economies. Although consensus on the matter does not
exist, several studies conclude that corruption inhibits productive investment or otherwise lowers
GDP growth. Corruption can also a¤ect GDP indirectly by having an impact on the number
of rms or individuals choosing to operate informally the shadow economy. This paper focused
on the last aspect.
The paper examined the relationship between corruption and shadow economy. It was as-
sumed that the level and type of corruption could have an impact on the size of shadow economy,
but reverse causality from shadow economy to corruption was not analyzed. The study empha-
sized the view that di¤erent manifestations of corruption, such as bribes to get projects or
licences or bribes to lower taxes, could have di¤erent consequences. Because some corrupt prac-
tices tend to be more commonplace in some countries than in others, the implication is that the
consequences of corruption could di¤er between countries.
To analyze the question, a theoretical model of an economy with formal and informal sectors
was developed. Two cases were analyzed: in the rst one, bribes were paid to get projects
or licenses, while they were paid to lower taxes in the second case. In both models, the size
of shadow economy was endogenously determined, as rms could choose to function either in
formal or informal economy. Relative costs of corruption depended on the size and political
connectedness of the rm, so that some rms were better equipped to deal with corruption.
This helped to determine the relative sizes of formal and informal sectors. The results showed
that the impact of corruption on the size of shadow economy depends on the type of corruption.
If bribes were paid to get projects, more severe corruption always enlarged shadow economy
and corruption and shadow economy were complements. In contrast, if bribes were paid to
lower taxes, the e¤ect of corruption on shadow economy size was ambiguous: in extreme cases,
corruption could actually decrease informal economic activity. It was concluded that such a
relationship would be more probable in the presence of low-quality institutions.
Second, the issue was examined empirically via instrumental variables regressions. The rst
results based on the traditional way of doing things were not robust: while some regressions
seemed to indicate that corruption could have a positive impact on the size of shadow economy,
others implied just the opposite. Instead, strong rule of law, high GDP per capita in the previous
period and strict regulation of wages and prices seemed to lead to smaller shadow economy more
consistently. When an interaction term of the level of corruption and the tropical area fraction of
a country was added to the analysis, the picture changed somewhat. The results indicated again
that stricter wage and price regulation a¤ect the size of shadow economy negatively, but they
implied also, and quite robustly, that the higher the tropical area fraction of a country, the more
signicant the impact of corruption. That is, the higher the share of a countrys area located
in tropics, the more a certain level of corruption increases informal economic activity. On the
other hand, corruption does not seem to a¤ect the size of shadow economy outside tropics.
As to the question of whether corruption and shadow economy are complements or substi-
tutes, the model assumed that higher corruption leads, in general and particularly when bribes
are paid to get licences, to higher share of informal economy. However, the model showed that
the type of the corruption matters so that, in some extreme cases, corruption and shadow econ-
omy could actually be substitutes with negative correlation between the two. According to the
empirical part of the paper, there is no evidence to either direction outside tropics. Instead, it
seems that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in tropics. In terms of the model,
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this implies that the type of corruption prevalent in tropics would be closer to bribes that are
paid to lower taxes. Moreover, the model implied that corruption and shadow economy are more
likely to be substitutes, if institutes are of poor quality. Empirical results support this, if it is
assumed that the countries situated in tropics su¤er generally from low-quality institutions. On
the other hand, the result is in contrast with Dreher and Schneider (2006), who concluded that
the relationship between corruption and shadow economy was likely to be positive in low-income
countries.
There were some di¤erences between the theoretical and empirical parts. First, the model
assumed for simplicity that the level of corruption was xed, but the empirical part recognized
the endogeneity of corruption and used, accordingly, instrumental variables. Second, the em-
pirical analysis explained the size of shadow economy as percent of o¢ cial GDP instead of the
share of rms choosing to go informal. In the model, larger shadow economy leads always to
smaller formal economy, but the empirical part did not make such an assumption. All in all,
the paper did not try to answer the question of the impact of corruption on GDP. However, its
conclusion on the signicance of geography in magnifying the impacts of corruption should also
tested in the context of GDP.
There are, in addition, various paths that future research on the relationship between cor-
ruption and shadow economy could follow. First, availability of panel data on shadow economy
sizes would o¤er an interesting opportunity to examine how the relationship between corruption
and shadow economy has evolved over time. Similarly, time aspect could be added to the model.
This would be particularly useful by making it possible to endogenize the level of corruption.
Finally, a model with more than just one type of corruption could give more insight on the
nature of the relationship.
A Appendix
A.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A1. Summary Statistics (3-year averages for 2000-2002)
Variable (Source) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Shadow economy size (Schneider) 144 34.470 13.118 8.6 67.833
Instrumented variable
Corruption (Transparency International) 103 4.511 2.355 0.8 9.867
Corruption (ICRG) 133 2.8 1.159 0.417 6
Corruption (Dreher et al.) 90 3.056 1.522 -0.175 10.115
Included instruments
(Log of ) GDP per capita, lagged 200 7.519 1.574 4.582 10.576
Fiscal burden (Heritage Foundation) 157 3.641 0.712 1.375 5
Fiscal burden (World Bank) 109 16.509 7.558 1.263 47.890
Rule of law (Kaufmann et al.) 179 -0.020 0.962 -1.838 2.090
Wages and prices (Heritage Foundation) 157 2.807 0.798 1 5
British legal origin (La Porta et al.) 169 0.337 0.474 0 1
French legal origin (La Porta et al.) 169 0.450 0.499 0 1
Socialist legal origin (La Porta et al.) 169 0.154 0.362 0 1
German legal origin (La Porta et al.) 169 0.030 0.170 0 1
Scandinavian legal origin (La Porta et al.) 169 0.030 0.170 0 1
Excluded instruments
Tropical area fraction (Roodman) 144 0.484 0.478 0 1
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Roodman) 121 0.405 0.295 0 0.93
Religious fractionalization (La Porta et al.) 177 0.444 0.231 0.002 0.860
Note : Corruption index of Dreher et al. was extrapolated by the author before taking 3-year averages
of all the variables.
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A.2 Countries
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Côte dIvoire, Denmark, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, India, Indone-
sia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep.,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozam-
bique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela, RB, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Note: Data not available for all countries in all regressions of Table 1 (maximum number of
countries 95 in regression 2, minimum 79 in regression 1)
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